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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IDA M. JOHNSON, Administratrix 
of the Estate of C. TENNYSON 
JOHNSON, deceased, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-v.s.-
ARTHUR HARDMAN, dba HARD-
MAN AUTO SALES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
C.ase No. 864 7 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
(Numbers in parenthesis refer to pages of the 
record. The parties will he referred to here as they ap-
peared in the trial court) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is the second in a series of five cases which 
were tried before the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District involving a head-on collision which occurred 
on December 20, 1954. The defendant Nathan Child 
was driving a 1951 International pickup truck east on 
highway 40, 10 miles west of Salt Lake City, when it 
collided with an .automobile in which the de-ceased, C. 
Tennyson Johnson, was a passenger. The liability of 
defendant Hardman was based upon the faet that de-
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2 
fendant Child was his agent and servant and was on 
a joint venture with him. Verdict and J udgrnent were 
rendered in favor of plaintiff again.st both defendants 
Hardman and Child in the sum of $43,628.23. 
The first case in this group to reach this Court 
was Anderson vs. Hardman, No. 8580, the opinion in 
which case has been rendered but has not been reported 
either in the Pacific Reporter or the Utah Reports. 
The facts in the Anderson case and the present ca.se 
are the same. It clearly appears that the truck driven 
hy Child belonged to Hardman and ·was being driven in 
furtherance of Hardman's business as a used car dealer. 
Hardman testified that he did not intend to transfer 
title until he arrived at Sunset (37, 38) and ~tated that 
when they reached there the papers completing the deal, 
including a conditional sales contract, would be signed 
( +!). He further testified that when they left Tooele 
there had been no discussion about "~hether there would 
be a provision for attorneys fees, about the form of the 
note or contract or about whether title would be retained 
hy Hardn1an ( -!6, -tS, 49). 
'Ve sub1nit that the opinion in Anderson Ys. Hardman 
has rP~oln'd the i ~sues in tl1is case in fayor of respond-
ent and against appellant. 
The Staten1ent of Facts contained in the brief of 
a pp<>lla.nt liard1nan is inaccurate and does not fairly 
set forth the evidence. Howeyer. we do not feel it neces-
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sary to make a Statement of Facts because the state-
ment of facts contained in the Anderson opinion accur-
ately sets forth the testimony and a reading of that 
opinion will supply the Statement of Facts in the pres-
ent case. 
We will meet e.ach of the points raised by appellant 
in the order in which he sets them forth in his brief. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT DEFENDANT NATHAN CHILD WAS THE 
AGENT OR SERVANT OF DEFENDANT HARDMAN OR 
HI'S JOINT VENTURER AND DEFENDANT HARDMAN IS 
LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT CHILD 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS 
ON THE LAW OF THE CASE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A MATTER OF 
LAW THAT DEFENDANT NATHAN CHILD WAS THE 
AGENT OR SERVANT OF DEFENDANT HARDMAN OR 
HIS JOINT VENTURER AND DEFENDANT HARDMAN IS 
LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT CHILD 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
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We submit that this Court in Anderson vs. Hardman 
has ruled as a matter of law that defendant Hardman is 
responsible for the negligence of defendant Child and is 
liable for any damages proximately caused by such negli-
gence. This Court states : 
"The basic question on appeal is whether 
or not under the facts the conceded negligence 
of defendant Child can be imputed to the defend-
ant Hardman under one of the following theories, 
to-wit: 
(a) Child was the employee of Hardman. 
(b) Child was Hardman's agent. 
(c) Child and Hardman were engaged in a 
joint enterprise. 
There is no substantial conflict in the evi-
dence : and the facts concerning the relation be-
tween Hardman and Child are uncontroverted. 
The question is what conclusion of law must be 
dra\vn fron1 the evidenc.e. ·· 
This ( 'onrt then went on to hold that the evidenc-e 
established that the title to the truck had not passed from 
Jfa.rrlman to Child ru1d that Child and Hardman were 
acting in furtherance of tl1e business of Hardman in 
effecting a sale of the truck to Child. The trip from 
Too<'h' to ~nn~Pt was in furtherruwe of Hard.Inan's busi-
lW~s and "·.as for the purpose of cmnpleting the sale. 
~ill<'<' the unenntroverted f'\~idence establishes this 
t ht>rP <'an he no qtwstion but that Hardlnan is respon-
sihle as a nw t tt~r of law for the negligence of defendant 
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Child. We .submit that this determination disposes of 
the case and the Judgment should be affirmed. 
.t; POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS 
~:. ON THE LAW OF THE CASE. 
The defendant finds fault with the instructions of 
the trial court. These questioned instructions relate en-
tirely to the rela:tionship between Hardman and Child. 
Inasmuch as that relationship was established by un-
controverted evidence and as a matter of law defendant 
Hardman i,s responsible for Child's negligence, the Court 
need not consider these instructions. 
In order to make a complete answer to appellant's 
brief we, nevertheless, will consider the claimed errors. 
This Court in the Anderson opinion did not set forth 
in detail the clairned errors in instructions. It merely 
stated: 
"Nor do we find any prejudicial error in 
any instruction given by the court or in the n•-
fusal to give any requested instruction." 
A perusal of the bri·efs in that case shows the sarne 
type of error was claimed there· as here and this Court 
determined the instructions were without prejudicial 
error. Hence, we submit that the Anderson case i.s also 
authority for the proposition that the instructions in 
this case are correct. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
This instruction attempted to define and set forth 
the issues as reflected by the pleadings of the parties. 
While there i~ no statement by the trial court expressly 
saying that the defendant Hardman denied the agency 
relationship between Hardman and Child, it is pointed 
out that the defendants in their answers deny they were 
negligent. It is to be noted that the defendant Hardman 
in his answer (7) did not specifically deny the agency 
but 1nerely set forth a general denial. 
This instruction did not purport to set forth the 
dements that plaintiff would have to prove in order 
to recover judgment. This matter was fully covered 
by Instructions X o. 12 and 13 and plaintiff was thereby 
required to prove agency. Certainly e\eryone connected 
"·ith the case knew without any doubt that Hardman 
('ontended he was not responsible for the actions of 
Child. 
'r e submit that there was no prejudicial error com-
Init tt>d in giving this instruction and the jury was fully 
informed that it would be necessary for then1 to find 
h~· a preponderanre of the evidence the essential ele-
ment~ nece~~ary to 1nake out the relationship between 
Hardman and Child whicl1 'vould result in the respon-
~ihility of Hardman for the negligence of Child. 
IX~1,HPCTIOXS XO. 12 and 13 
Tilt>~<' two instruc.tions .are the ones which set forth 
the Plements JH'('Pssary for plaintiff to prove in order 
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to pennit the jury to return a verdict again.st defendant 
Hardman, once the negligence of Child was established. 
Instruction No. 12 relates to the question of whether 
or not title had passed to the defendant Child. This 
instruction is defendant Hardman's Reques.ted Instruc-
tion No. 8 with two modifications made by the trial 
· court in order that it might correctly reflect the law 
and its applica;tion to the case at bar. In it the jury 
is told if title had passed then Hardman would not be 
liable. This instruction, as well as instruction No. 13, 
stated that if the contr.act between the parties had not 
been agreed upon in all its terms then title could not pass. 
We submit that this is the well recognized rule 
in the law of sales. 
See Hi-Way Motor Co. vs. Service Motor Co., 68 
Utah 65, 249 P. 133 (1936) wherein the court in holding 
that there had been no completed contract and hence 
title could not pa.ss st3Jt·ed as follows: 
"It is no doubt true that, unless the minds 
of Hyrum Jensen and the man.ager of appellant 
had fully met respecting all of the essential terms 
of the alleged contract for the sale of the Ford 
sedan and the purchase of the Star sedan, the 
alleged contract failed of consummation, and 
hence .appellant cannot recover damages for a 
breach thereof, nor can it sustain an action of 
trover for the value of the old Ford ,sedan. It 
certainly is true that: 
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" 'In order that there may be an agreement 
the parties must have a distinct intention commo~ 
to both and without doubt or difference. Until 
all understanding alike there can be no assent, 
and, therefore, no contract. Both parties must 
assent to the same thing in the same sense and 
their minds must meet as to all terms.' 13 c.i 263, 
Sec. 48. 
"Further: 
" 'Where the parties have left an essential 
part of the agreement for future determination 
. . ' It IS no doubt correct to SR\ that the contract 
is not completed.' 6 R. C. L. p. 643, Sec. 59. 
"It seems entirely unnecessary to multiply 
authority upon a proposition so elementary as 
the one here in question, and we shall refrain 
from doing so. To the mind of the writer it is 
perfectly clear that no binding eontract existed 
between Hyrum Jensen and the appellant. 
• • • • • • • • • 
··For exan1ple, the question of how much of 
the purcha~e price of the Star sedan Jensen 
should pay in ra:-:h. how 1nuch should be settled 
hY the execution of a note. and the length of 
ti.me the note slwuld run, were all left for future 
rlPtPrmination. ~-\ll of these co11stituted essential 
element~. and until fully agreed upon by both 
pnrtiP~ either one lwd the right to refuse the 
1Prm~ of pa.~'lnent w"11ich nlight be proposed by 
the other; henre, tl1e contrart ''as inc01nplete and 
nnenfnr<'("\ahle. Nor does the fart that Jensen left 
thP old Ford sedan "'ith appellant to be sold 
h~· it and tlw proeeeds of the sale aceounted for 
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to Jensen alter the legal effect of the transaction. 
Nor did it vest the title of the ear in appellant. 
Such was no1t the intention of the parties and 
such w.as not the legal effect of the tran.saction 
as it then stood." 
Criticism is levelled at the portion of the instruction 
wherein the jury is told that if it found defendant Hard-
man delivered the truck to Child without any intention 
to retain any further interest in said truck, then Hard-
man was not responsible for its operation. Counsel says 
that the jury might have believed that Hardman re-
tained a .seller's lien or " a friendly interest." We submit 
that there was no mention of either type of interest in 
this ease. No mention or contention was made that a 
seller's lien existed. The simple proposition before the 
court and jury was whether Hardman intended to turn 
over completely and .absolutely his property interest in 
the truck. If he did not, then title had not passed. 
The next proposition to be decided by the jury 
was whether or not defendant Child was driving this 
truck for and on behalf of defendant Hardman. If this 
second element also existed, the plaintiff would be en-
titled to recover from Hardman as well .as Child. 
Under Instruction No. 13 it was necessary for plain-
tiff to establish this element in order for the jury to 
return a verdict in favor of plaintiff. If the jury found 
that Hardman requested Child to drive the pickup truck 
to Sunset where the contract would be finally determined, 
then Hardman would be responsible. In other words, it 
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was necessary for the jury to find that Hardman re-
quested that the truck be driven to the place where the 
parties would consummate their contract which would 
be in furtherance of the business of defendant Hardman. 
From these instructions it becomes evident that de-
fendant's claim that his theory of defense was not pre-
sented cannot stand. Plaintiff was required to prove • 
both passage of title and agency under the trial court's 
instructions. See JIFL' 10.6 and 10.7. 
This case has nothing to do with a conditional sales 
contract or dealer's "stickers." X o completed contract 
was ever entered into. It may be that when the parties 
arrived at Sunset a conditional sales contract would 
have been executed ( -1-1). 
There is no issue in this case about the effect of 
the relationship of conditional vendor and vendee on 
the qnP~tion of liability. Defendant Hardman did not 
place ~tiekers on the car. He placed his own dealer's 
platPs thereon. There is certainly a substantial distinc-
tion between sti.ekers and dealers· license plates. 
\\~e submit there is no error in any of the instruc-
tion~ gin~n. Plaintiff's t]teory of the ease was full)· 
on t I i nPd to the jury m1d it was required to find all of 
t ht> p~~l'n t ial elen1ents neeessary to find liability against 
dt>fendnnt llardman, ineluding the elenwnts of passage 
of tith' nnd Ag'Pll<'y. 
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CONCLUSION 
The facts in this case concerning the relationship 
of defendant Hardman and defendant Child are uncon-
troverted. There is no dispute in the evidence on this 
subject and we believe the determination of the existence 
of this relationship is one of law to be determined by 
the court. We submit that the relationship of agency 
' or master and servant exists in this case as a matter 
of law as has already been held by this Court in 
Anderson vs. Hardman, supra, and upon this ground 
alone the judgment should be affirmed. 
Also, there was no prejudicial error in any of the 
instructions. 
We submit the judgment of the trial court in favor 
of plaintiff and against defendant should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
by Brigham E. Roberts 
RICH, ELTON & MANGUM 
by Leonard W. Elton 
Counsel for Respondent 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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